Sorokin's dissociative thesis
Does intergenerational social mobility exact a toll on the wellbeing of individuals? It is not difficult to imagine the frustration, perhaps even the pain, that is felt by those who had skidded down the class structure. But do the upwardly mobile also pay a price for their occupational success? Some sociologists argue that they do. In this paper, I assess their claims with recent, large-scale and nationally representative survey data.
The view that social mobility has negative and disruptive effects on individuals and society has a long pedigree, going back in particular to the dissociative thesis of Sorokin (1959) . Sorokin accepts that mobile societies are more dynamic, versatile and inventive (p. 515). But he also thinks that social mobility puts severe strain on individuals, leading to higher rates of 'mental diseases and nervousness, psychoses, and neuroses ' (p. 515) and greater 'skepticism, sometimes even cynicism ' (p. 519) . Moreover, it is much harder for individuals to form intimate relationships in a mobile society where 'man more often cuts off the ties which bind him to his native place, occupation, party, state, religion, family, citizenship, and so on. He becomes less and less attached to anything and to anybody ' (p. 523) . The weakening of personal ties then leads to social isolation, loneliness (p. 522), and higher levels of suicide, hedonism and crime (p. 524).
Sorokin writes in a speculative and largely data-free manner. 1 And the first round of empirical tests of the dissociative thesis have produced rather mixed results. For example, Ellis and Lane (1967) and Mirande (1973) report supportive evidence, while Vorwaller (1970) and Wegner (1973) find the opposite. But as these studies are all based on small, local samples of quite specific social groupings, 2 it is difficult to know which of these conflicting findings are more credible or generalisable.
In a follow-up inquiry of the Oxford Social Mobility Study, Goldthorpe (1987) has collected self-completed life history notes from a subsample of 247 respondents. Summarising these notes, he argues that the upwardly 1 Some of Sorokin's claims are plainly bizarre. For example, he argues that 'the mobile character of present social life facilitates also a skeptical attitude and a lack of very firm faith and convictions . . . Skepticism, sometimes even cynicism, is spreading. Relativism begins to reign supreme in sciences and intellectual constructions. It finds its supreme expression in Einstein's theory of relativity' (Sorokin, 1959, p. 519) .
2 Ellis and Lane (1967) was based on a survey of 126 male students entering Stanford University in 1958. Mirande (1973) was based on a sample of 275 respondents drawn from a small community of about 5,000 people. Wegner (1973) was based on 1,588 undergraduates of the University of Hawaii. Vorwaller (1970) was based on two samples: one of white males in Cambridge and Belmont, Massachusetts; the other being white mothers of elementary schoolchildren in Detroit, Michigan. ternal conflict that organizes every moment of existence" ' (2014, p. 362) . Moreover, his 'own empirical work has supported this conception of mobility as exhausting and discomforting' (Friedman, 2014, p. 362) .
Other scholars also discuss upward mobility in similar terms. Thus, Lee and Kramer (2013, pp. 18-19) maintain that students of low and middleincome background attending elite colleges need to learn 'elite mannerisms, behaviors, and "rules of the game" . . . caus [ing] a "cleft" between the students' college identity and habitus and their home communities. ' Curl (2013, p. 293) argues that many of the upwardly mobile 'express disdain for and struggle internally with some of the changes they have made and undergone . . . [they have] difficulty in maintaining connection with their families of origin and therefore feel distance from their roots and what once made them who they are.' This 'creates pain, loss and guilt and represents a significant cost to mobility not yet theoretically developed or popularly understood' (Curl, 2013, p. 298) . 3 Given the above, Friedman (2016, p. 145) argues that 'upward mobility may not always be so straightforwardly "beneficial", particularly at the individual, subjective level.' And he calls for 'a large-scale re-examination of the mobility experience ' (2014, p. 360) . 4 Similarly, Curl (2013, p. 292 ) calls for 'a "reshaping" of our nation's conception of upward mobility ' and Reay (2013, p. 660) seeks to 'problematize dominant discourses of social mobility. ' Much of the recent support of the dissociative thesis comes from qualitative interviews or autobiographical writings. But it is important to note that not all qualitative studies come to the same conclusion. In particular, Reay et al. (2009) carry out in-depth interviews with nine working-class students at an elite English university. As their research is framed by the Bourdieusian notion of habitus, they had expected to find the working class students having difficulties 'maintain [ing] connections to one's social background, including family, friends and the wider community.' But, to their surprise, 'this rarely seemed to be the case. There was not "the disconnection from family and cultural backgrounds"' (Reay et al., 2009 (Reay et al., , p. 1005 . Reay et al. (2009 Reay et al. ( , p. 1006 note that their working class respondents have not had 'middle-class cultural practices such as out-of-school dance, drama, art and music lessons or private tuition . . . their schooling did not provide easy access to forms of dominant cultural capital sanctioned and recognised by the educational system.' And whilst the students recognise that their elite university is a 'middle-class bubble', they do not seem to be torn between home and college. Instead, they have 'visits from family and home friends. There are accounts not just of parents visiting their colleges and staying overnight but also of siblings, grandparents, even aunts and uncles ' (p. 1111) .
Insofar as these students have anxiety about university, it has more to do with the academic demand than with 'the social aspects of the experience' (p. 1112). Indeed, Reay et al. (2009) observe that '[a] majority of these working-class students had faced the paradoxical situation of being more like a "fish out of water" in their largely working-class state secondary schools . . . they have a greater sense of fitting in as learners in elite HE than they had at school surrounded by people like them' (p. 1115). Overall, Reay et al. (2009) conclude that 'academically successful working-class students gain enormously from studying at [elite] institutions . . . flourishing as learners and growing in confidence both academically and socially, whilst retaining . . . a commitment and sense of loyalty to family and home background ' (p. 1116) .
It is interesting to compare the account of Reay et al. (2009) with her own personal experience. In an autobiographical essay, she writes that 'social mobility can often be a difficult, alienating process alongside its more positive aspect of educational success and fulfilment. It can tear community and sometimes even the family out of the heart of individuals. I struggled to keep my family close despite moving so far away in terms of social space . . . [it] is difficult to avoid a sense of treachery and overwhelming guilt. As a result, despite immense relief and gratitude at my privilege, I have an enduring ambivalence about what I have and who I have become that characterizes many of the upwardly mobile' (Reay, 2013, pp. 672-673) .
How do we reconcile Reay et al. (2009) with other qualitative studies or, indeed, with Reay (2013) ? Clearly, the experience of social mobility is very variable. But such variability underlines the need for large-scale and nationally representative data for us to gain a reliable view of whether, overall, social mobility has an adverse effect on the wellbeing of individuals. As Marshall and Firth (1999, p. 30 ) point out, 'writers of autobiography are almost by definition truly exceptional individuals . . . Case-studies of small groups among the socially mobile may or may not be representative and might well therefore point to misleading conclusions. ' Marshall and Firth (1999) analyse survey data from ten countries of the International Social Justice Project 5 and report that 'individuals who move from working-class origins to middle-class destinations are no more likely to be systematically satisfied or dissatisfied with life than are the socially immobile' (Marshall and Firth, 1999, p. 28) . Houle and Martin (2011, p. 193) analyse data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Survey and 'find little evidence for Sorokin's hypothesis; mobile individuals are no more likely to be psychologically distressed than their non-mobile counterparts.' 6 Pooling data from 18 waves of the British Household Panel Survey and using job satisfaction and overall life satisfaction as dependent variables, Clark and D'Angelo (2013, p. 2) show that 'the most satisfied individuals are those . . . who have experienced the most upward social mobility.' Similarly, Nikolaev and Burns (2014, p. 82) analyse pooled General Social Survey data and 'find that downward mobility . . . has a negative effect on the self-reported level of happiness and subjective health while upward mobility is associated with positive outcomes in subjective well-being. ' Several points about these four survey-based papers are notable. First, Clark and D'Angelo (2013) and Nikolaev and Burns (2014) report that the upwardly mobile fare better than the immobile. So their findings are stronger than those of Marshall and Firth (1999) or Houle and Martin (2011) who report no difference in wellbeing by mobility experience. This discrepancy might partly be due to the different ways in which social mobility is measured, and/or the different analytical models used.
7 Second, such discrepancy notwithstanding, it is clear that all recent studies that draw on large-scale survey data do not support the dissociative thesis. 8 5 The ten countries are Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Great Britain, Estonia, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, West Germany, and the USA.
6 Houle (2011) examines the dissociative thesis in the context of intragenerational mobility, and comes to the same negative conclusion.
7 Marshall and Firth (1999) and Houle and Martin (2011) define social mobility as movement between discrete social classes. But Clark and D'Angelo (2013) measures social mobility with the continuous Hope-Goldthorpe scale. Nikolaev and Burns (2014) define social mobility using measures of educational attainment, income and social class. As regards analytical model, Marshall and Firth (1999) and Houle and Martin (2011) use the diagonal reference model (Sobel, 1981) , while Clark and D'Angelo (2013) and Nikolaev and Burns (2014) use OLS models.
8 A reviewer kindly refers me to two recent papers. Based on data from a Flemish survey, Daenekindt (2016, p. 1) 'find[s] no detrimental consequences of both upward and downward mobility, the results do not provide evidence for the dissociative thesis. ' Hadjar and Samuel (2015) use panel data from Switzerland and the UK to examine the impact of intergenerational and intragenerational mobility on subjective wellbeing. Using fixed effects models, they claim to have found support for the dissociative thesis for the UK but Third, the dependent variables considered in these four papers are selfreported subjective measures of one kind or another, e.g. overall life satisfaction or psychological distress. The literature on the dissociative thesis, however, speaks to broader issues of social isolation, kinship networks, civic participation, and social ties in general. Also, Layard (2005) points out that some of the most important determinants of the wellbeing of individuals are the social ties that they have with family, community and friends. Given this, further investigation of the impact of social mobility on a range of social relational outcomes as well as subjective wellbeing measures is warranted.
Data and analytical strategy
The data that I analyse come from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and Understanding Society. BHPS began in 1991 with a nationally representative sample of about 5,500 households. All members of these households and their children (when they reach the age of 16) have been followed in annual interviews in subsequent years. After 18 waves, BHPS was superseded in 2009 by a new household panel survey called Understanding Society which has a sample of about 30,000 households and over 54,000 individuals. At the time of writing, five waves of Understanding Society data are available for analysis.
There is a wealth of data in the BHPS and Understanding Society that speaks directly to the dissociative thesis. There are, for example, questions on intimate relationships and on routine social interaction. There are measures of civic participation, of subjective wellbeing, and of social support. Many of these questions are repeated every few years. Where this is the case, I use the most recent data in the analysis. To be clear, I analyse BHPS and Understanding Society data as though they were crosssectional in nature.
9 This is because my goal in this paper is to establish the direction of the association between social mobility and the wellbeing not for Switzerland. That is to say, they claim that in the UK intergenerational upward mobility is associated with lower levels of subjective wellbeing. I would argue that their analysis is flawed. As is well known, with fixed effects, all time-invariant predictors drop out from the models, and the social origin of individuals (i.e. parental social class when the respondent was 14 years of age) is precisely one of those time-invariant predictors.
9 Thus, where applicable, each respondent contributes one observation to each regression model. The N of the regression models ranges from 3,668 to 15,795 (see the Appendix). Such a large range is mainly due to the much larger sample size of Understanding Society. of individuals.
I restrict my analysis to respondents aged 20 to 64 at the time of the relevant interview. The main explanatory variables are the social origin and destination of the respondents, 10 coded to the threefold version of the Goldthorpe class schema (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992) . The three classes are the salariat (S), the intermediate class (I) and the working class (W). Broadly speaking, this class schema seeks to capture key differences in employment relations. Two factors are important: first, employment status, i.e. whether someone is an employer, a self-employed person, or an employee; and, second, among employees, whether someone has a 'service contract' as opposed to a 'labour contract'. 'Members of the salariat are advantaged over members of the working class in that they experience i) greater long-term security of income . . . ii) less short-term . . . fluctuation of income . . . and iii) better prospects of steadily increasing income over the life course' (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 2002, pp. 33-34) . For these reasons, Erikson and Goldthorpe (2002, p. 34) Duncan (1966, p. 91) points out that 'one is not entitled to discuss "effects" of mobility . . . until he has established that the apparent effect cannot be due merely to a simple combination of effects of the variables used to define mobility.' In other words, to speak of social mobility effects, we need to establish not only the main effects of origin and destination, but also their interaction effect (i.e. particular combinations of origin and destination) on the outcome of interest. There are various ways to model the interaction effects of origin and destination. In this paper, I parameterise the interaction effects by cross-classifying class origin and class destination, distinguishing nine mobility trajectories.
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The dissociative thesis holds that mobile individuals are socially isolated, bereft of social support, have lower level of wellbeing, and so on. Given this, my analytical strategy is to regress relevant measures of social ties, civic engagement, subjective wellbeing, etc on the respondent's mobility trajectory. My regression models control for the basic demographic characteristics of individuals, namely their age, sex, ethnicity, marital status, parental status, and employment status. Some basic descriptive statistics of the covariates are shown in Table 4 in the Appendix.
Results
In view of the large number of outcome variables considered in this paper, I will focus on the estimates of four mobility trajectories: immobility in the working class (W→W, i.e. the bottom-right cell of Table 5 ) which is the reference category, immobility in the salariat (S→S, the top-left cell), longrange upward mobility from the working class to the salariat (W→S, the bottom-left cell), and long-range downward mobility from the salariat to the working class (S→W, the top-right cell). 13 The contrast between immobility in the salariat and immobility in the working class reveals the overall class difference in wellbeing. But it is the estimates of W→S and S→W that are of particular interest, because if there are any social mobility effects on wellbeing, they should be most apparent in cases of long-range upward and downward mobility.
Routine social interaction
Let us start with two measures of routine social interaction. In 2008, BHPS respondents were asked 'How often do you talk to any of your neighbours?' and 'How often do you meet friends or relatives who are not living with you?' Table 1 reports the distribution of their response to these questions. I dichotomise the two variables by contrasting the first response category ('most days') against the rest, and use them as the dependent variable in logistic regression models.
14 The full results of these (and other) regression models are reported in the Appendix. Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities, along with the 95% confidence intervals, of our respondents having almost daily contact with neighbours (left panel) or with friends or 13 Full regression results, including sample size, estimation method, and the parameter estimate and standard error of all predictors are reported in Tables 6 to 13 in the  Appendix. 14 I have repeated the analyses with a threefold contrast between 'most days', 'once or twice a week', and 'less often'. Using the trichotomised variables in multinomial logit models, I obtain similar results as those reported here. Details are available on request. The left panel shows that, under our model, 28% of the second-generation salariat and 27% of the upwardly mobile talk to their neighbours almost daily, compared with 38% of the downwardly mobile and 42% of the immobile working class (the reference category). A very similar pattern holds for almost daily meeting with friends or relatives (right panel). Overall, it is clear that working class respondents are more likely to have very frequent contact with neighbours, friends or relatives. But the determinant of such everyday social interaction is current class position, not mobility experience. Indeed, if class origin and class destination are entered as main effects into the logit models without the interaction term, none of the class origin parameters are statistically significant. 
Civic engagement, volunteering and giving to charities
In 2011-12 (wave 3), respondents of Understanding Society were asked: 'Are you currently a member of any of the kinds of organisations on this card?', and 'Whether you are a member or not, do you join in the activities of any of these organisations on a regular basis?' 17 Figure 2 reports the distribution of the response to these two questions. As the modal response for either variable is, by a long way, 0, the level of formal civic engagement in the UK is rather low (the mean for membership is .9, and that for activity is .8).
I use these two count measures as the dependent variable in separate Poisson regressions. The top panels of Figure 3 show a clear gradient by mobility trajectories in formal civic engagement. In terms of membership, the mean for those who are second-generation salariat are 1.5, followed by the upwardly mobile (1.2), the downwardly mobile (.9) and the immobile in the working class (.6). All of these means are significantly different from each other. A very similar pattern holds for being active in civic organisations.
In wave 4 (2012-13) of Understanding Society, respondents were asked: 'In the last 12 months, have you given any unpaid help or worked as a volunteer for any type of local, national or international organisation or char- 16 Details are available from the author. 17 The types of organisation listed are: (1) Political party, (2) Trade Unions, (3) Environmental group, (4) Parents'/School Association, (5) Tenants'/Residents' Group or Neighbourhood Watch, (6) Religious group or church organisation, (7) Voluntary services group, (8) Pensioners group/organisation, (9) Scouts/Guides organisation, (10) Professional organisation, (11) Other community or civic group, (12) Social Club/Working men's club, (13) Sports Club, (14) Women's Institute/Townswomen's Guild, (15) Women's Group/Feminist Organisation, (16) Other group or organisation. Overall, Figure 3 shows that in terms of involvement in civic organisations, volunteering and charitable giving, the socially mobile are inbetween those who are immobile at the top or the bottom of the class structure. But contrary to the dissociative thesis, there is no evidence that mobile individuals are socially disengaged.
Contact with parents
Echoing the functionalist claim that the extended family is not compatible with the high level of social mobility in industrial societies (Parsons, 1949) , Friedman, Curl, and others argue that social mobility has adverse effects on kinship ties. This view is directly testable with data from wave 5 (2013-14) of Understanding Society. In that survey, respondents with a non-coresident mother and/or a non-coresident father were asked how often they see mother and father, or contact them by telephone, email Table 2 shows the distribution of the frequency of intergenerational contact. I dichotomise these measures (contrasting the first three response categories against the rest), and use them as the dependent variable in logistic regression models. The top-left panel of Figure 4 shows that, compared with individuals who are immobile in the working class, second-generation salariat and the social mobile (whether upwards or downwards) are less likely to see their mother regularly. This finding is consistent with Friedman's claim. However, it is well known that for a number of reasons salariat parents and children tend to live farther apart. For example, salariat job opportunities may be more dispersed geographically. The higher income and greater wealth of the salariat could also lead them to search for housing opportunities over a broader area (see e.g. Chan and Ermisch, 2015a,b) .
18
When I control for intergenerational proximity, the pattern is reversed, with 68% of those immobile in the salariat, 65% of the upwardly mobile, 66% of the downwardly mobile, and 62% of the immobile working class report seeing their mother regularly (see top-central panel of Figure 4) . In other words, although intergenerational social mobility is often accompanied by geographical mobility which, in turn, constrains the frequency of face-to-face meeting, this does not necessarily imply a weakening of the intergenerational bond. Within the same broad category of intergenerational proximity, the socially mobile are actually slightly more likely to see their mother regularly.
Further support for this argument can be found when we turn to consider intergenerational contact by telephone, email or letter, i.e. means 
Close personal relationships
In addition to contact with parents, wave 5 of Understanding Society contains the following questions that tap how the respondents relate (separately) to their partner/spouse, members of immediate family, and friends: (1) 'How much do they really understand the way you feel about things?' (2) 'How much can you rely on them if you have a serious problem?' (3) 'How much can you open up to them if you need to talk about your worries?' (4) 'How much do they criticise you?' (5) 'How much do they let you down when you are counting on them?' (6) 'How much do they get on your nerves?' I use the response to these questions to form three additive scales, with higher scores denoting closer personal relation- 
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Using the scale scores as the dependent variable in OLS regressions, Figure 5 shows that, compared to immobile individuals in the working class, second-generation salariat report more positive relationships with their partner/spouse, immediate family, and friends. And crucially for our present purpose, the same is true of the upwardly mobile.
20 So there is no support for the view that upward mobility is achieved at the cost of intimate relationships.
Social support
Does close personal relationship translate into social support? In 2007, BHPS respondents were asked: 'Is there anyone you could rely on to help you from outside your own household, (1) if you were feeling depressed?' (2) 'if you needed help finding a job for yourself or a member of your family?' (3) 'if you needed to borrow money to pay an urgent bill like electricity, gas, rent or mortgage?' Overall, 84%, 63% and 78% of the respondents replied 'yes' to these three questions respectively. 21 Figure 6 shows how the level of social support from outside the household varies with mobility trajectories under logistic regression models. In all three cases, when compared to individuals who are immobile in the 19 There are four response categories to these questions, ranging from 'a lot' through to 'not at all'. The Cronbach's alpha of the three scales equals .79, .76 and .71 respectively. 20 Regarding relationship with partner/spouse, the magnitude for the upward mobility parameter is .11, compared to the absolute magnitude of the gender parameter of .08. Thus, the upward mobility effect is about a third larger than the gender difference. The standard deviation of all three scales is just under .7. 21 There are actually three response categories to each of these questions: 'Yes', 'No' and 'Not sure'. I combine the last two categories and contrast them against the first. Someone outside household to borrow money from probability Figure 6 : The probability of having support from someone outside the household by mobility trajectories working class, second-generation salariat fare better and the downwardly mobile are not worse off. As regards the upwardly mobile, they are significantly more likely to receive support of an instrumental kind. Specifically, 66% of them have someone to help them find jobs and 83% have someone from whom they could borrow money. The figures for the secondgeneration working class are 57% and 77% respectively. Thus, contrary to the dissociative thesis, upwardly mobile respondents are not bereft of social support. 
Job satisfaction, life satisfaction, and GHQ
In wave 5 of Understanding Society, respondents were asked: 'On a scale of 1 to 7 where 1 means "Completely dissatisfied" and 7 means "Completely satisfied", how dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your present job overall?' They were also asked to evaluate their life overall using the same seven-point scale. The left panel of Figure 7 shows that the modal response to both questions is 6 ('Mostly satisfied'), and the top two categories (i.e. 'Mostly satisfied' and 'Completely satisfied') jointly account for about half of the respondents. In other words, most respondents are quite 22 There is a further set of five questions on the emotional and moral support that respondents might have: (1) 'Is there anyone who you can really count on to listen to you when you need to talk?' (2) 'Is there anyone who you can really count on to help you out in a crisis?' (3) 'Is there anyone who you can totally be yourself with?' (4) 'Is there anyone who you feel really appreciates you as a person?' (5) 'Is there anyone who you can really count on to comfort you when you are very upset?' At least 95% of the respondents said 'yes' to each of these questions, and there is very little difference by mobility trajectories in the level of emotional or moral support received. Details are available from the author. In addition, the survey contains the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ), which was originally devised as a screening tool for identifying minor psychiatric disorders in the general population. But it is also commonly used as a measure of subjective wellbeing. The GHQ measure in Understanding Society is constructed from twelve items. 24 Its scores range from 0 (least distressed) to 36 (most distressed). The right panel of Figure 7 plots the distribution of the GHQ score of the respondents. Figure 8 shows that, compared with those who are immobile in the working class, upwardly mobile respondents and second-generation members of the salariat are more satisfied with their job (left panel) and with their life overall (central panel). These differences are statistically significant, but they are relatively small in substantive terms. For example, re-23 There are three further life satisfaction questions, dealing with how satisfied the respondents are with their income, health and leisure. Analyses of these items give similar results to those reported here. Details are available from the author on request. garding overall life satisfaction, the mean for second-generation salariat is 5.3, followed by the upwardly mobile (5.1), the downwardly mobile (5.1) and the immobile working class (4.9). Finally, second-generation salariat and the upwardly mobile seem to be slightly less distressed than those who are immobile in the working class. But these differences are, at best, on the borderline of statistical significance (right panel). 25 Overall, though, the results of this Section do not support the dissociative thesis. Kahneman and Deaton (2010) argue that there are two related but different dimensions of subjective wellbeing, each has its own covariates. First, there is '[e]motional wellbeing . . . [which] refers to the emotional quality of an individual's everyday experience-the frequency and intensity of experiences of joy, stress, sadness, anger, and affection that make one's life pleasant or unpleasant' (Kahneman and Deaton, 2010, p. 16,489) . But this is quite different from the second dimension of 'life evaluation' which is about how individuals think about their life in a more reflective and longerterm perspective. The GHQ score considered above is more akin to Kahneman and Deaton's first dimension, i.e. emotional wellbeing. But there are also a couple of measures in the BHPS which tap life evaluation.
Life evaluation
In wave 16 of the BHPS, respondents were asked whether they think a list of statements apply to themselves, two of which seem particularly relevant to our present concern: 'On balance, I look back on my life with a sense of happiness', and 'I feel satisfied with the way my life has turned out'. There are four response categories to these statements: 'Often', 'Sometimes', 'Not often' and 'Never'. I contrast the first category against the rest (see Table 3 ), and use the two binary variables thus formed as the dependent variable in logistic regression models. The left panel of Figure 9 shows that 65% of the second-generation salariat and 64% of the upwardly mobile often look back on life with happiness, compared to 49% of the downwardly mobile and 46% of the immobile working class. A similar picture holds for whether the respondent often feels satisfied with the way life has turned out (the right panel).
It seems clear that the upwardly mobile evaluate their life quite positively, at least more so than those who are immobile in the working class. It is difficult to reconcile these findings with the view of the upwardly mobile as angst-ridden individuals, suffering from a 'crippling insecurity', with 'a sense of self torn by contradiction and internal division.' 4 Summary and discussion Sorokin (1959) , Friedman (2014 Friedman ( , 2016 , and several other scholars have argued that social mobility comes at a high price to the individuals who experience it. They claim that the upwardly mobile are socially isolated, bereft of support, less likely to form intimate relationships, have lower level of wellbeing, and so on. In this paper, I test these claims with data drawn from two recent, large-scale and nationally representative surveys, namely the British Household Panel Survey and Understanding Society.
Members of the working class, whether they are of the first or the second generation, are more likely to have almost daily interaction with neighbours, friends or relatives. But if the salariat are less likely to drop in on someone, they (and the socially mobile) are more likely to be involved in civic organisations or to volunteer. So rather than suggesting that the salariat or the socially mobile are less sociable, it seems more accurate to say that individuals of differing mobility experience favour different forms of sociability.
The socially mobile and the salariat are less likely to see their parents at least once a month. But this is entirely due to the greater geographical distance between parents and children in these cases. Once physical proximity has been taken into account, the pattern is reversed. That is to say, within broad categories of intergenerational proximity, the socially mobile are actually more likely to see their parents regularly. Social mobility is often accompanied by geographical mobility, which constrains the frequency of face-to-face meetings between the generations. This does not, however, imply a weakening of the intergenerational bond. In this sense, there is no evidence that social mobility adversely affects kinship ties.
Moreover, the upwardly mobile and the second-generation salariat report more positive relationships with partner/spouse, members of immediate family, and friends. They report higher levels of job satisfaction and overall life satisfaction. They are more likely to have someone from outside the household to offer instrumental support; more likely to look back on life with happiness, or to feel satisfied with the way life has turned out. And there is no evidence that upward mobility is associated with greater psychological distress.
All in all, the evidence from large-scale systematic surveys is pretty clear. They do not support the dissociative thesis. On a range of social relational indicators as well as on several direct measures of wellbeing, the upwardly mobile tend to do as well as, and in many cases better than, those who are immobile in the working class.
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How do we make sense of these findings? It seems to me that the arguments that Goldthorpe sets out in relation to his 1974 data are still relevant. That is, despite the large and persisting inequality in relative mobility chances that prevails in the UK (Goldthorpe, 2013) , a considerable number of people of working class origins do manage get into the salariat (Goldthorpe, 1987, p. 207) . Being upwardly mobile is not really such a rare and isolating experience.
Furthermore, although a status order, in the classical Weberian sense, can still be identified in contemporary British society, deference is undeniably in long-term decline (see e.g. Chan and Goldthorpe, 2004; Runciman, 1997) . The empirical evidence is that social status is an important predictor of particular aspects of life choice, but not of life chances in general (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007) . And it would be misleading to consider contemporary British society to be so hidebound in social status that the upwardly mobile are frozen out of social relationships. 27 Friedman and other scholars are right to be wary of politicians' declared support for promoting social mobility. For example, Nick Clegg, then Deputy Prime Minister, writes that 'improving social mobility is the principal goal of the Coalition Government's social policy.' 28 As Corak (2013, p. 79) argues, 'an emerging body of evidence suggests that more inequality of incomes in the present is likely to make family background play a stronger role in determining the adult outcomes of young people, with their own hard work playing a commensurately weaker role.' 29 In other words, a precondition for more social mobility is actually a more egalitarian so- 26 Friedman argues that the experience of social mobility might be particularly problematic for women and ethnic minorities. I have repeated the analyses of this paper with subsamples of women or of ethnic minorities. I have also repeated the analyses for younger respondents between the ages of 20 and 35. In all these sensitivity tests, the results obtained are broadly in line with those reported in the paper. Details are available from the author on request. 27 As Goldthorpe (1987, p. 207 ) puts it, '[e]ven if we were to accept that the serviceclass core, or even smaller groupings within it, may still seek to preserve their status exclusivenss and will refuse social acceptance to arrivistes, this would still in no way imply that the latter would be deprived of opportunities for sociability within their class of destination. And of course the very extent of the inflow into the service class must in itself have increased the difficulty of maintaining status barriers.' 28 The quote is from the 2011 policy paper 'Opening doors, breaking barriers: a strategy for social mobility' published by the Cabinet Office and the Deputy Prime Minister Office.
29 Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) make a similar point when they note that while the pattern and levels of relative social mobility are generally speaking very similar across nations, egalitarian Sweden seems to be more fluid than the other cases in their sample. ciety, something many politicians are less keen on. Even more starkly, Goldthorpe (2013) and Goldthorpe and Jackson (2007) point out that most politicians of all complexions might not fully realise that in order to equalise relative mobility chances, there must be more downward mobility from the salariat. It is hard to see how any political party will ever campaign for more children of the better off skidding down the class structure.
But it would be wrong to suggest that upward mobility is in general a negative experience for those who have achieved occupational success. There is simply no support in the data for the dissociative thesis. We should bear in mind that individuals in advantaged social positions tend to have lower divorce rates (Härkönen and Dronkers, 2006) and better health (Marmot, 2010) ; they are less likely to experience long-term or recurrent unemployment (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007) , and are less likely to live with a fear of crime (Pantazis, 2000) . Given that a stable marriage, good health, a safe physical environment, and financial security are among the most important determinants of wellbeing, should we not expect the upwardly mobile to fare better than those who are immobile in the working class?
Finally, our result is asymmetric in the sense that although the upwardly mobile tend to fare better than the immobile working class, those who have experienced long-range downward mobility are not worse off. This asymmetry is puzzling given the Easterlin paradox and loss aversion. To elaborate, the Easterlin paradox (Easterlin, 1974 (Easterlin, , 1995 suggests that social comparison is key to the subjective wellbeing of individuals. As it is reasonable to assume that individuals compare their own circumstances with those of their parents, this could explain why the upwardly mobile do better than the immobile working class.
30 But how then do we explain the finding that the downwardly mobile are not worse off than those who are immobile in the working class? Moreover, it is well established that subjectively speaking loss is felt much more keenly than gain of the same magnitude (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984) . Perhaps this is an example of habituation (Brickman et al., 1978) whereby people return to their previous level of wellbeing after experiencing a large gain (e.g. winning a lottery) or a large loss (e.g. becoming a paraplegic in an accident). In other words, even among the downwardly mobile, many do adapt to their loss over the medium and long run. But clearly more research on the experience of downward mobility is called for. .045
A Online appendix: descriptive statistics and the full results of regression analyses

